



Sentence diagramming a method of showing the relationship between
different parts of a sentence-has long been used by judges to interpret legal
texts. This Comment documents how judges employ sentence diagrams in
constitutional, statutory, and contract cases. It finds that diagramming plays an
important role in constitutional and statutory cases, complementing traditional
canons of legal interpretation, but that diagramming is less often used in
contract cases forfear of disadvantaging grammatically unsophisticatedparties.
In addition, this Comment defends the practice ofjudicial diagramming as a way
of improving textualist interpretation and promoting broader values ofjudicial
opinion writing.
Introduction .................................................... 325
I. A Primer on Sentence Diagramming ................... ....... 329
II. Diagramming Judicial Interpretation ................... ....... 330
A. Diagramming Statutes and Constitutions .................... 330
B. Diagramming Contracts. ........................ ...... 334
III.Diagramming as Interpretive Principle .................... 337
A. Why Diagram? ................................ ..... 337
1. Diagramming as Textualism ................. ...... 338
2. Diagramming as Legal Imagery ............. ........ 339
B. When to Diagram? ......................... ......... 341
Conclusion ..................................................... 341
Introduction
Sentence diagramming-a method of showing the relationship between
different parts of a sentence-may now have its most influential proponent. As
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a number of commentators have recently noted, the newest member of the
Supreme Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch, is a fan of diagramming sentences.
In United States v. Rentz, then-Judge Gorsuch used a sentence diagram to
2 3interpret 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The "enigmatic" provision states
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that
provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court
of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such
crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime-be sentenced to a term of
4
imprisonment of not less than 5 years.
The defendant in Rentz "use[d]" a firearm only once (he fired a single shot)
but he did so "during and in relation to" two separate "crimes of violence" (he
hit two individuals with that shot).5 The appeal concerned whether the
government had to prove a separate act of using a firearm for each charge or
6whether a single act could give rise to multiple charges.
To answer this question, Judge Gorsuch included a simplified diagram of
the provision in his opinion:
1. See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Supreme Court Nominee Takes Legal Writing to Next Level,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:26 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-nominee-takes-legal-
writing-to-next-level-1485912410 [http://perma.cc/5994-MSE5]; Jason Steed, Sentence Diagramming,
FORMA LEGALIS (Dec. 21, 2016), http://formalegalis.org/2016/12/21/sentence-diagramming
[http://perma.cc/73G2-FSXT]; Ben Zimmer, Gorsuch v. Prepositional Phrases, LANGUAGE LOG (Feb. 1,
2017, 1:09 AM), http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=30739#more-30739 [https://perma.cc/9HLR-
QXZJ]. In his response to the Senate Judiciary Committee's questionnaire, Justice Gorsuch listed United
States v. Rentz as one of "the 10 most significant cases over which [he had] presided." Alison Frankel,
Decoding Gorsuch's Picks for His 10 "Most Significant" Opinions, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-gorsuch/decoding-gorsuchs-picks-for-his-10-most-significant-
opinions-idUSKBN15U2WZ [http://perma.cc/7QXP-7MJZ] ("I suspect Judge Gorsuch spotlighted the
Rentz opinion as an example of his textualist philosophy. In the decision, he literally parsed the statutory
language, like a middle school teacher teaching grammar by diagramming sentences.").
2. 777 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
3. Id. at 1106.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
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Referencing this visual aid, he concluded that "during and in relation to . . . a
qualifying crime [of violence]" modified "an act of using, carrying, or possessing
[a firearm]" and that, therefore, each charge required both a distinct act of using
a firearm and a resulting crime of violence.8
Significantly, Justice Gorsuch is not alone among judges in his
diagramming ways. Indeed, judges have used sentence diagrams for over a
century9 and have publically acknowledged their value in resolving cases.'0 But
scholars, by contrast, have largely overlooked how courts use this simple
interpretive tool."
It should come as no surprise that judges diagram legal texts, as diagrams
can offer important insights into the meaning of a sentence. Judges have long
turned to dictionaries as an outside resource for understanding semantic
meaning the meaning of individual words or phrases.12 And more recently,
7. See id. at 1109.
8. Id. at 1110-11.
9. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
10. See Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan
Supreme Court, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 261, 266 (2004) ("For those of you who think that diagramming
sentences in grade school was a waste of time, it has been used often by our Court to make sure we have
the correct reading of a sentence.").
11. A few commentators have studied how lawyers use sentence diagrams. See, e.g.,
Lisa Eichhorn, Old Habits Sister Bernadette and the Potential Revival of Sentence Diagramming in
Written LegalAdvocacy, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 79 (2016); Omar Ha-Redeye, Diagramming for
Statutory Interpretation, SLAW (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.slaw.ca/2014/08/24/diagramming-for-
statutory-interpretation [http://perma.cc/5SHG-PQW8]. And more broadly, scholars have recognized that
sentence diagramming can aid in legal interpretation, without considering how judges have actually used
diagrams in practice. See, e.g., Sean Donahue, Limitations on Judicial Review: A Semiotic Interpretation
of Statutes, 7 UCLA ALASKA L. REV. 204, 216-34 (1978); Jeffrey P. Kaplan & Georgia M. Green,
Grammar and Inferences ofRationality in Interpreting the Child Pornography Statute, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1223 (1995); Gary Monserud, An Essay on Teaching Contracts and Commercial Law for the First Time
(Even If You Have Taught These Courses Many Times Before), 82 N.D. L. REV. 113, 143 (2006) (noting
that the author "dr[ew] grammar school-like sentence diagrams" when parsing statutes).
12. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme
Court's Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013).
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some courts have also begun to use new digital technologies, such as Corpus
Linguistics, for the same purpose.13 But judges have fewer outside resources for
understanding syntactic meaning-the meaning of words and phrases within the
broader context of a sentence.14 And because courts lack tools for understanding
syntactic meaning, they may sometimes discount the importance of this
context.'5 Although the traditional grammar canons of statutory construction
may address some of these questions,16 sentence diagramming offers courts a
more flexible interpretive resource for understanding syntax.
In this way, this Comment bucks the recent academic trend toward
promoting new technologies in legal interpretation. '7 Instead, it argues that,
when trying to understand the syntax of a sentence, courts may be well served
by the old standby of grade-school English teachers.
Part I provides a brief overview on the practice and history of sentence
diagramming. Part II then examines the actual and rhetorical use of sentence
diagrams in judicial opinions.'8 Although rhetorical references to diagramming
may not directly inform judicial interpretation, they do indicate a broader
awareness of sentence diagrams among the judiciary and may also suggest some
undisclosed judicial diagramming. Part II also contrasts how courts diagram
statutes and constitutions with how they diagram contracts and other less formal
legal documents. Finally, Part III offers a normative defense of diagramming
interpretation. Like other interpretive tools, sentence diagrams may have their
limitations. But, overall, sentence diagramming can help judges interpret legal
texts and improve the communicative value of their opinions.
13. See, e.g., James C. Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning:
A New Tool To Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21 (2016).
14. But see id. at 26 (noting that some corpora can be used to identify syntactic
relationships).
15. See Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge To Resort to the
Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 401 (2003) ("Recently,
dictionaries have seemed like a good idea to judges. Acting on an instinct that determining the meaning
of a sentence requires no more than defining the individual words that comprise it, judges habitually turn
to dictionaries when faced with indeterminacy in interpreting statutory sentences . . . . [But] [d]ictionaries
simply are not capable of explaining complex linguistic phenomena. . .").
16. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 140-166 (2012) (describing "syntactic canons"); Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the
Common Law ofInterpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 362 (2010) (listing grammar and syntax canons).
17. See, e.g., Philips et al., supra note 13; Alice A. Wang, Googling for Meaning:
Statutory Interpretation in the Digital Age, 125 YALE L.J. F. 267 (2016).
18. This study examined judicial opinions discussing sentence diagrams found through
the following searches on WestLaw: (sentence /s (diagram OR grammar)) and ((grammar OR syntax) /s




I. A Primer on Sentence Diagramming
Sentence diagrams illustrate the grammatical relationship between different
parts of a sentence. Or as one commentator put it, sentence diagrams are "a
picture of what language looks like."19
Diagramming a sentence involves two basic steps. First, a reader must
distinguish the various parts of the sentence-for example, the subject(s),
verb(s), object(s), etc. And second, she must identify the relationship between
the various parts of the sentence-that is, which words modify or refer to other
words. The theory is that by "cutting a sentence up into its component parts,"
sentence diagramming "require[s] [a reader] to think about what words are and
how they work together" and, therefore, makes her "more likely to use
[language] correctly." 20
To illustrate, consider the simple sentence: "Ronnie handed the dog the
treat."21 The subject of the sentence is "Ronnie," so it is placed at the beginning
of the diagram. The verb is "handed," so it follows "Ronnie" but is separated by
a vertical line that goes through the base of the diagram. The direct object is
"treat," so it follows "handed" but is separated by a vertical line that does not cut
through the base. The indirect object is "dog," so it is written on a line under the
verb. Finally, both "treat" and "dog" are modified by the articles "the," which is





19. Juana Summers, A Picture of Language: The Fading Art of Diagramming
Sentences, NPR (Aug. 22, 2014, 7:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2014/08/22/341898975/a-
picture-of-language-the-fading-art-of-diagramming-sentences [https://perma.cc/HL6S-CSTG].
20. Elizabeth Ruiz Frost, A Worthwhile Skill: The Upside ofDiagramming Sentences,
OR. ST. B. BULL. (June 2015), https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/15jun/legalwriter.html
[https://perma.cc/PFK9-J82Y].
21. For this example, see Deborah White Broadwater, Diagramming Sentences, MARK
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Sentence diagramming is an American tradition.23 It first arose in the mid-
nineteenth century, but came into vogue in 1877, when Alonzo Reed and
24Brainerd Kellogg developed the Reed-Kellogg diagram. Justice Gorsuch's
diagram in Rentz, as well as many other diagrams included in judicial opinions
and briefs, are of the Reed-Kellogg variety.25 For decades, English teachers used
the Reed-Kellogg diagram to teach grammar, but beginning in the 1960s,
sentence diagramming fell out of favor among educational theorists.26 Yet, as the
next part will show, diagramming has retained adherents among the f deral and
state judiciary.
II. Diagramming Judicial Interpretation
Perhaps not surprisingly, judges-like the general publiC27 have mixed
feelings about sentence diagrams. Some enthusiastically support diagramming;
others find it to be a tedious exercise in grade-school grammar. But beyond
personal preferences, one important factor that affects whether judges use
diagrams in their opinions is the type of text being interpreted. Courts appear the
most open to diagramming statutes and constitutions, while they are more
skeptical of diagramming contracts and other less formal legal documents.
A. Diagramming Statutes and Constitutions
In both state and federal cases, courts use sentence diagrams as an aid in
interpreting statutes and constitutions. In a few decisions, such as Rentz, judges
even include the actual diagram in their written opinions.
Over 150 years ago, for example, an Ohio judge used a primitive sentence
diagram to show that the phrase "whether called as a witness" modified each of
the three indirect objects in a statute:
23. See Summers, supra note 19.
24. See KITTY BURNS FLOREY, SISTER BERNADETTE'S BARKING DOG 29-43 (2006).
25. See Eichhorn, supra note 11 (showing examples of Reed-Kellogg diagrams used in
briefs).
26. See Summers, supra note 19. Linguists have continued to diagram sentences, but
they more commonly use other types of diagrams, such as the tree diagram. See STEVE PINKER, THE
SENSE OF STYLE 78-82 (2014). Choice of diagram is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion
of different types of diagrams, see Eicchorn, supra note 11, at 84.
27. See Kitty Burns Florey, Taming Sentences, N.Y TIMES: OPINIONATOR BLOG (June
18, 2012, 8:39 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/taming-sentences [http:/perma.cc





Likewise, the California Court of Appeals recently included a sentence
diagram to show that the state constitution imposed numerous limitations on the
governor's authority to negotiate compacts:
Figure 4 29
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And most recently, the Texas Court of Appeals used an unconventional
sentence diagram "to provide a visual explanation" of a medical malpractice
statute's ambiguity:
Figure 530
28. See Neil ex rel Neil v. Cherry, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 417, 1859 WL 4457, at *3 &
n.al (Ohio Com. Pl. May 1, 1859). For the original diagram, see 3 REPRINT OF OHIO PUBLISHED CASES
IN WESTERN LAW MONTHLY 420 (1896).
29. Stand Up for California! v. State, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 490, 509 (Ct. App. 2016).
30. D.A. v. Texas Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton, 514 S.W.3d 431, 437 & n.6
(Tex. App. 2017).
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But more commonly, when judges use sentence diagrams to interpret legal
texts, they simply reference the diagrams without including the actual figures in
their opinions. In these cases, sentence diagrams serve a number of interpretive
purposes. Courts have, for instance, used diagrams to identify words "clearly
implied" by the text31 and to understand "the meaning of the word arrangement
,,32of the statute. Judges may also use diagrams to identify the various parts of a
sentence.33 In criminal cases, for example, Texas courts use the "eighth-grade
grammar test" to determine which parts of a statute create an element of the
offense.34 They "diagram[] the statutory text according to the rules of grammar"
to identify the criminal elements: "(1) the subject (the defendant); (2) the main
verb; (3) the direct object if the main verb requires a direct object (i.e., the offense
is a result-oriented crime); [(4)] the specific occasion; and [(5)] the requisite
mental state."35
Judges most commonly reference sentence diagram when attempting to
show a provision's clarity or ambiguity. In establishing the former, courts
36sometimes refer to what a diagram actually shows, but may also simply
mention sentence diagramming as a rhetorical device for dismissing a party's
weak interpretive claim.37 As one judge dramatically put it, if he accepted the
party's strained interpretation of the statute, "not only were the efforts of [the
judge's] past English teachers (who in that distant past forced diagramming and
parsing of sentences ad infinitum, ad nauseum) wasted, but their earthly remains
would take on gyroscopic manifestations."3 8
31. Cleveland Tel. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 121 N.E. 701, 714 (Ohio 1918).
32. State Bd. of Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 611 P.2d 805, 809-10
(Wyo. 1980).
33. See Goyette v. Country Villa Serv. Corp., No. G039580, 2008 WL 2461433, at *4
(Cal. Ct. App. June 19, 2008) (unpublished opinion); State v. Acker, 838 A.2d 1016, 1018 (Conn. App.
2004); State v. Gates, 325 N.W.2d 166, 168 (N.D. 1982).
34. Kent v. State, 447 S.W.3d 408, 414 (Tex. App. 2014), rev'd, 483 S.W.3d 557 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see also
Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring). But see
Chambliss v. State, 647 S.W.2d 257,259-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (rejecting "the byegone [sic] practice
of 'diagramming,' whereby sentences were broken into their component parts to see what words 'went
with' what").
35. Kent, 447 S.W.3d at 414 (quoting Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 714-15 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007)). In contrast, "adverbial phrases" are not usually elements of the offense. Jourdan v.
State, 428 S.W.3d 86, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
36. See People ex rel. Burke v. Dist. Court of Second Judicial Dist., 141 P.2d 893, 895
(Colo. 1943); see also Cty. of Orange v. FST Sand & Gravel, Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 633, 635 (Cal. App.
1998) (suggesting what a diagram would prove).
37. See Scardino v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.07-282, 2007 WL 3243753, at *4 n.2
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2007) (unpublished opinion); Brownell v. Raubenheimer, 112 F. Supp. 154, 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 216 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1954); In re DiVall Insured Income Props. 2 Lt'd. P'ship,
445 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); State ex rel. Conner v. Noctor, 140 N.E. 878, 883 (Ohio
1922); Dir. of Dep't of Agric. & Env't v. Printing Indus. Ass'n of Texas, 600 S.W.2d 264, 270 (Tex.
1980).
38. In re Albertson, 68 B.R. 1017, 1020 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
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Judges also use the difficulty of diagramming a sentence to suggest textual
ambiguities.39 After establishing a text's ambiguity, courts feel liberated to look
beyond the statute's plain meaning to its purpose or the drafter's intent.4 0 Given
these various uses, it makes sense that judges have described sentence
diagramming as a "trick of the trade in statutory construction"4'1 and a "lost art."42
But diagramming also has a complicated relationship with legal
interpretation. In some cases, a sentence diagram can support one of the
grammatical canons of construction that courts apply in everyday cases.43 But in
44others, a sentence diagram may conflict with an interpretive canon. In State v.
Unterseher, for example, the North Dakota Supreme Court included in its
opinion a diagram submitted by the defendant:
Figure 645
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39. See Evoy v. Ill. State Police, 429 F. Supp. 2d 989, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Casazza v.
Dep't of Commerce, 350 N.W.2d 855, 859 n.6 (Mich. App. 1984).
40. Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Ind. ex rel. Zoeller, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078-79 (S.D.
Ind. 2011), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Indiana, 736 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir.
2013); Stiglitz Furnace Co. v. Stith's Adm'r, 27 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Ky. 1930).
41. State v. Holcomb, 886 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Wis. App. 2016).
42. Evoy, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 995 n.2.
43. See Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Barr, 194 So. 2d 890, 894 (Miss. 1967);
State v. Navaro, 26 P.2d 955, 959 (Utah 1933).
44. See Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Cin. City Council, 620 N.E.2d 267, 268
(Ohio Com. Pl. 1993).
45. 289 N.W.2d 201, 202 (N.D. 1980).
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Although the court "intend[ed] no criticism" of the diagram "prepared by
Rita A. Johnson, an English instructor at Bismarck High School," it quickly
dismissed the defendant's diagrammed interpretation by citing a number of the
state's codified interpretive canons.46 Whether because of the law-like nature of
interpretive canons47 or because manyjudges "never really understood" sentence
48diagramming in the first place, courts consistently preference canons over
-49diagrams.
In particular, there are a number of interpretive rules that take precedence
over sentence diagrams. First and most importantly, courts follow the "plain
meaning rule."50 In short, they will prioritize a sentence's clear meaning over a
diagrammatically correct (but perhaps less natural) reading.5 Second, courts
consider the broader statutory context of the sentence.52 Then-Judge Gorsuch,
for example, once noted that courts must "take account of surrounding text,
structure, and context" and should not "interpret isolated statutory phrases solely
according to grammatical diagrams. Finally, in the face of ambiguity, courts
will look to a statute's purpose.54 In other words, courts will not allow "bad
grammar . . . to defeat the operation of a statute" and will accordingly interpret
the law according to its purpose or the legislature's intent56 rather than strict
grammatical rules.
B. Diagramming Contracts
Although judges also use sentence diagrams to interpret contracts, they
generally take a more flexible approach to syntactic meaning in contract cases.
Put another way, courts have often refused to allow technical rules of grammar
46. Id at 202-03. A codified canon is an interpretive rule prescribed by the legislature
in a statute rather than one just announced by courts in judicial opinions. See Scott, supra note 16.
47. See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law ofInterpretation, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 1079 (2017); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011).
48. Collins v. Ky. Tax Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 303, 306-07 (Ky. 1953).
49. See, e.g., Berry's Chapel Util., Inc. v. Tenn. Regulatory Auth., No. M2011-02116-
COAR12CV, 2012 WL 6697288, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012).
50. See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfier, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 539, 545 (2017) ("[T]he plain meaning rule uses the phrase ... to denote obvious meaning-
that is, the meaning that is clear.").
51. See In re Keinath Bros. Dairy Farm, 71 B.R. 993, 995 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987);
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Barr, 194 So. 2d 890, 894 (Miss. 1967); Peterson v. Midwest Sec.
Ins. Co., 636 N.W.2d 727, 732 n.7 (Wis. 2001); Com. v. Cioppa, 6 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 452 (Com. Pl.
1989); De Gooyer v. Nw. Trust & State Bank, 228 P. 835, 836 (Wash. 1924), aff'd, 232 P. 695 (Wash.
1925).
52. See SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 16, at 167-244 (describing "contextual canons").
53. United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 949 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring), abrogated by Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012).
54. See Scott, supra note 16, at 395-96 (discussing purpose canons).
55. Smith v. Haney, 85 P. 550, 550 (Kan. 1906) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. See Tyler v. Tyler, No. CV115029427S, 2013 WL 5663287, at *7 (Conn. Super.




to defeat what appears to have been the shared understanding of the parties to
the contract.57
In some ways, judges diagram contracts just as they diagram statutes and
constitutions. Courts may, for instance, diagram a contractual provision to
51establish a contract's plain meaning or to show its ambiguity. Some unwieldy
sentences just seem to "def[y] diagramming"59; others "require[] [such]
extensive diagramming" that it is evident that they are "vague and
unintelligible." 60 Also, like in statutory cases, courts may reference sentence
61diagrams rhetorically to dismiss "strained" interpretations of a contract. In one
case, for example, an appellate court specifically mentioned the lower court
judge's admission "that he never understood how to diagram sentences" before
reversing his interpretation of the contract.62
But despite these similarities between public law and private law cases,
courts are in general more likely to disregard sentence diagrams when
interpreting contracts. For example, in Niven v. Smith, the diagramming Ohio
63judge-mentioned already -received a sentence diagram from one of the
parties in a contract dispute:
57. That courts will sometimes disregard sentence diagrams in the face of a clear
contractual purpose does not settle how courts should identify the contract's purpose. In other words, both
"textualist" and "contextualist" judges may reject diagrammed meaning. Shawn Bayern, Contract Meta-
Interpretation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2016) (distinguishing "contextualists," who "favor a
broad inquiry into the intent of contracting parties," from "textualists," who "favor a narrower, supposedly
more predictable interpretive focus on the text of written contracts"); see also Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text
and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 37-43 (2014)
(contrasting justifications for textualism and contextualism). These competing theories are also called
"classicalism" and "intentionalism." Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"?
The Failure of the Contract Analaogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1157-67 (1998)
(discussing history of "classicalism" and "intentionalism").
58. See Howell v. Union Producing Co., 392 F.2d 95, 101 n.7 (5th Cir. 1968); Md. Cas.
Co. v. Scharlack, 31 F. Supp. 931, 934 (S.D. Tex. 1939), aff'd, 115 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1940); Hosp. Serv.
Corp. of Ala. v. Eubanks, 55 So. 2d 755, 756-57 (Ala. Ct. App. 1951); Sea v. Acousti Eng'g Co. of Fla.,
352 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); In re Chambers's Will, 4 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Sur.),
adhered to on reargument, 7 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sur. 1938); In re Kenny's Will, 220 N.Y.S. 188, 195 (Sur.
1926), aff'd, 166 N.E. 337 (N.Y. 1929).
59. State Auto Ins. Co. v. Clifford, No. CIV-05-0259-F, 2005 WL 2210217, at *3 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 12, 2005), aff'd, 195 F. App'x 786 (10th Cir. 2006).
60. Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Universal Const. Maint. Integration Co., No.
B144260, 2002 WL 849970, at *5 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 2002).
61. In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 215 BR. 409, 415 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997); see also
Penn Cent. Corp. v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. CIV. A. 91-12453-Z, 1993 WL 370827, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept.
7, 1993); accord In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 21 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion)
(dismissing argument based on party's "creative sentence diagramming").
62. Breakwater Cove Condo. Ass'n v. Chin, No. A-1420-09T3, 2010 WL 4878779, at
*4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 2, 2010).
63. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Figure 764
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But unlike in his prior ruling-decided just a year before-the judge in Niven
concluded that "the grammatical construction" of the contract "must yield to the
obvious purpose of the parties."65
Niven reflects the broader view among courts that neither "grammatical
rules"66 nor "'diagramed' meaning[s]" should defeat the "reasonably clear"
purpose of a contract.67 In other words, judges typically find that contracts
"should be construed in a manner 'which makes sense to an intelligent layman
familiar only with the basics of English language."'68 Courts reason that a private
individual "should not have to resort to retaining an 'expert in sentence
diagraming' in order to properly interpret his or her" contract.69 As one judge
noted, "the kind of pettifoggery and hairsplitting which would have undoubtedly
delighted Miss Snow, my seventh grade English teacher, who taught us how to
64. 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 337, 1860 WL 3940, at *3 n.al (Ohio Com. Pl. July 1, 1860).
For the original diagram, see 2 REPRINT OF OHIO PUBLISHED CASES IN WESTERN LAW MONTHLY 340
(1896).
65. Niven, 1860 WL 3940, at *3 n.al.
66. Lake Isabella Prop. Owners Ass'n/Architectural Control Comm. v. Lake Isabella
Dev., Inc., No. 204954, 1998 WL 1988641, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1998) (unpublished opinion)
(quoting Borowski v. Welch, 324 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)).
67. Thornhill v. Sys. Fuels, Inc., 523 So. 2d 983, 1007 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J.,
concurring in denial of petition for reh'g); see also In re Peregrine Fin. Grp., 487 B.R. 498, 508 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2013) (finding that the "difficulty [of] diagram[ming] [an] ungainly sentence" should not defeat
the apparent purpose of a provision).
68. Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 352 (Miss. 1990) (quoting
Thornhill, 523 So.2d at 1007 (Robertson, J., concurring in denial of petition for reh'g)); see also
Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d 266, 275 (Miss. 2003) (same).




rip sentences into unrecognizable (but diagrammable) shreds . . . is completely
contrary to the way insurance contracts are supposed to be construed.70
In summary, although courts are willing to follow strict rules of grammar
when interpreting the carefully drafted language of constitutions and statutes,7
they take a more purposivist approach when interpreting legal documents that
72may have not been the product of precise drafting.
III.Diagramming as Interpretive Principle
Sentence diagramming is not simply a matter of judicial practice; it may
also advance deeper normative principles of legal interpretation and judicial
opinion writing. As dictionaries have done for semantic meaning, sentence
diagrams may provide judges with a helpful external resource for deciphering
syntactic meaning. In addition, the visual nature of sentence diagrams may make
judicial opinions more accessible to the public.
Still, we should also recognize the limitations of sentence diagramming.
Specifically, diagrams are less useful when the case raises an interpretive
question that does not implicate syntactic meaning, when the document at issue
may not have been the result of careful drafting, or when the text is already clear.
A. Why Diagram?
Sentence diagramming serves at least two key purposes in legal
interpretation. First, it can assist judges in determining the plain meaning of the
text. And second, it can increase the communicative value of legal opinions.
70. Lincoln Ins. Co. v. Home Emergency Servs., Inc., 812 So. 2d 433, 436 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001) (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
71. See, e.g., FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2006) (discussing the drafting process for state constitutions); Victoria F.
Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics ofLegislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 575 (2002) (discussing drafting process for federal statutes); Grace E. Hart, Note, State Legislative
Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 262 (2016) (discussing drafting process
for state statutes).
72. Courts treat other less formal legal texts in a similar way. For example, judges often
ignore diagrammed meaning of search warrants, see United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th
Cir. 2009) (noting that "[a] warrant need not necessarily survive a hyper-technical sentence diagraming
and comply with the best practices of Strunk & White"); United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 992 (10th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Alston, No. 15 CR. 435 (CM), 2016 WL 2609521, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29,
2016), or jury instructions, see United States v. McDougal, 137 F.3d 547, 558 (8th Cir. 1998); Coe v.
Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 357 (6th Cir. 1998) (Moore, J., dissenting); Garrett v. Campbell, 360 F.2d 382, 386
(5th Cir. 1966); Jones v. McCully, 285 N.W. 551, 553-54 (1939). This is not to say that judges only
diagram statutes and constitutions. See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(rejecting a party's claim that contempt order was unclear just because it required "detailed 'sentence
diagramming' to arrive at the district court's reading"); Harris v. Quadracci, 48 F.3d 247, 254 (7th Cir.
1995) (accepting the lower court's "methodology of diagramming and parsing" defendant's allegedly
defamatory statements). Rather, it simply appears that diagramming has a narrower purpose when the
underlying legal text is not the product of careful drafting.
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1. Diagramming as Textualism
To the extent that "we're all textualists now," 73 judges should sometimes
use sentence diagrams as a tool for improving textualist interpretation. As an
initial matter, sentence diagrams immerse a reader in the text.74 If we believe that
judges should focus first and foremost on text rather than on statutory purpose
or legislative intent,5  diagrams can help ground and discipline judicial
interpretation. Moreover, textualism requires that a judge do more than just look
at the words in the document. We would ideally want courts to have a more
rigorous interpretive methodology than the judge "who never understood how to
diagram sentences" but "looked at the language several times and concluded that
76a reasonable person could read the sentence" in a certain way. The appellate
court that reversed the judge presumably agreed.
In the past, judges have turned to dictionaries to improve their
understanding of semantic meaning. The Supreme Court, in particular, has
"invoke[d] dictionary definitions as an objective and relatively authoritative
resource for discerning ... ordinary meaning."78 Admittedly, some scholars have
criticized the Court's use of dictionaries as subjective.79 But although it may be
easy to identify examples of subjective interpretation, it is much harder to
provide an affirmative account of neutral interpretation. Moreover, recent
scholarship has suggested that, at least in theory, more interpretive resources
need not increase judicial discretion.s As a result, it seems more productive to
debate how not whether-courts use outside interpretive tools.
73. Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the
Reading of Statutes, at 8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-
discusses-statutory-interpretation [http://perma.cc/5XU2-RNNA] ("I think we're all textualists now in a
way that just was not remotely true when Justice Scaliajoined the bench."); accord William N. Eskridge,
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-
1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1090 (2001) ("[T]he proposition that statutory text ... ought to be the
primary source of statutory meaning ... needs little defense today. We are all textualists."); Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise andFall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006) ("[W]e are all textualists in an
important sense."); Marjorie 0. Rendell, 2003-A Year ofDiscovery: Cybergenics and Plain Meaning in
Bankruptcy Cases, 49 VILL. L. REV. 887, 887 (2004) ("We are all textualists now."); Jonathan R. Siegel,
Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998) ("In a
significant sense, we are all textualists now.").
74. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
75. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consenus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1829-46 (2010)
(proposing that courts should always first consider whether the text has a plain meaning, even if they
ultimately may turn to other resources in the face of textual ambiguity).
76. Breakwater Cove Condo. Ass'n v. Chin, No. A-1420-09T3, 2010 WL 4878779, at
*4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 2, 2010).
77. See id.
78. Brudney & Baum, supra note 12, at 486-87.
79. See, e.g., id. at 489.
80. See Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd-Do More Interpretive Sources
Mean More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (2017).
81. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16




The deeper problem with dictionaries may be that they only provide courts
with one form of textual meaning. As a number of commentators have noted,
legal texts "cannot be understood merely by understanding the words in [the
document]."82 Rather they "can be interpreted accurately only in a fairly
comprehensive context."83  Dictionaries can therefore be a misleading
interpretive source to the extent that they "do not provide [this] context."84
Sentence diagrams can help courts correct this interpretive problem by
providing judges with a tool for deciphering syntactic meaning. In this regard,
sentence diagrams are not fundamentally different from the grammar canons.
But whereas the grammar canons identify a few specific syntactical rules,
sentence diagramming provides an adaptable framework for dissecting
sentences. Admittedly, this feature can also be a flaw as diagrams may be
susceptible to judicial manipulation. As others have noted, how one diagrams a
sentence may, at times, be a subjective exercise.86 But as with dictionaries and
even well-accepted canons of interpretation,8 7 our debate should be about how
to diagram correctly and in a more consistent way, not whether to diagram in the
first place.
2. Diagramming as Legal Imagery
Sentence diagrams may also improve the communicative value of judicial
opinions. In our legal system, judges do not simply answer questions; they also
show their work. One purpose of written opinions is in disciplining judicial
the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J.
167 189-98 (2010) (same).
82. A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1994); see also Hoffman, supra note 15, at 402
(criticizing the "Dictionary Method" where courts "treat sentence interpretation as a word-by-word task").
83. Randolph, supra note 82, at 74.
84. Id.; see also Hoffman, supra note 15, at 401 ("Dictionaries simply are not capable
of explaining complex linguistic phenomena. .. ").
85. I say "begin" because contextual meaning may extend beyond a single sentence or
even the statute. See Randolph, supra note 82, at 74-78 (arguing that courts may sometimes need to look
to legislative history to understand statutory text).
86. See Eichhorn, supra note 11, at 95. At least one commentator has criticized Justice
Gorsuch's diagram in Rentz for oversimplifying the structure of the sentence. See Lucy Ferriss,
Diagramming Gorsuch, LINGUA FRANCA (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/linguafranca
/2017/02/09/diagramming-gorsuch [https:/perma.cc/65UD-T6Y6]. But when one considers the more
complete but also more complicated diagram, see id, Justice Gorsuch's decision to prioritize visual
accessibility over technical accuracy makes more sense. Cf Adam Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an
Echo ofScalia in Philosophy and Style, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31
/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-nominee.html [http://perma.cc/4WE3-RZK7] ("Judge Gorsuch is
a lively and accessible writer.").
87. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950) (noting that
most canons conflict with one another); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J.
909 (2016) (documenting use of conflicting canons in Supreme Court opinions).
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reasoning, and as discussed above, sentence diagrams can add rigor to judicial
interpretation.89 But written opinions also provide an important "law announcing
function": they explain the court's reasoning so that future litigants and courts
need not inductively determine "legal rules, principles, standards, and policies"
by combing through individual cases.90 Instead, the opinion itself offers broader
legal guidance.
Sentence diagrams can help promote this communicative function. For
example, a long and convoluted statutory provision, like § 924(c)(1)(A), raises
many interpretive questions. In an ordinary opinion, a court would only decide
the narrowest grammatical relationship in the statute, which leaves the meaning
of the rest of the provision shrouded in syntactic mystery. In contrast, by
diagramming even a part of the provision, the court lays out an interpretive
framework for future courts and private parties. Admittedly, parts of the diagram
that do not directly address the question at issue would likely be treated as non-
binding diagrammatic dicta. But dicta may itself be a valuable source of
information in future cases.91
Despite their reputation for complexity, sentence diagrams may also make
some judicial opinions more accessible. Scholars have already argued that
including visual images in briefs can help litigants better communicate their
arguments to courts,92 and some judges have specifically called for parties to use
more visual aids.93 In addition, courts have long used images in their opinions to
communicate important facts about a case.94 It would be a simple and logical
next step for judges to include actual sentence diagrams in their opinions to help
future courts and litigants understand the rationale of their decisions.
88. See Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 810, 810 (1961).
89. See supra notes 74 and 77 and accompanying text.
90. Leflar, supra note 88, at 810-11.
91. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1253 & n.17 (2006) (arguing that dicta "can help clarify a complicated subject[,]
... can assist future courts to reach sensible, well-reasoned results[, and] ... can help lawyers and society
to predict the future course of the court's rulings."). Alternatively, we might view the structure of the
entire sentence as relevant to the court's reasoning and, thus, the entire diagram as a part of its holding.
See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994) (arguing that a holding should
include a court's rationale for its decision).
92. See, e.g., Adam L. Rosman, Visualizing the Law: Using Charts, Diagrams, and
Other Images to Improve Legal Briefs, 63 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 70 (2013).
93. See Eichhorn, supra note 11, at 86-87.
94. See Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use ofPhotographs,
Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1704 (1997); Elizabeth G.
Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1740-44 (2014); see also Rebecca Tushnet,
Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARv. L. REV. 683, 688-709 (2012) (discussing




B. When to Diagram?
In deciding when to diagram a sentence, judges should consider three
factors. First, courts should recognize that diagrams add little to debates about
semantic meaning. As Lawrence Solan has noted, "battles over statutory
meaning are nearly always about the 'wordlike' aspects of the statute's language
rather than the syntactic, rulelike aspects of the statute,"9 5 and diagrams shed
96little light on the meaning of the individual words in a sentence.
Second, as this Comment has shown, courts are more likely to diagram texts
that are the product of careful legal drafting, such as statutes or constitutions, as
compared to less formal legal documents, like contracts. In these latter cases,
courts seem particularly focused on protecting grammatically unsophisticated
parties. Without addressing broader questions about the correct method of
interpreting contracts,97 this Comment agrees that courts should be more careful
about diagramming legal texts that may not have been precisely drafted.
Finally, even in statutory and constitutional cases, courts should not allow
sentence diagramming to trump a text's plain meaning or other canons of
interpretation. As a result, diagrams may be most helpful for long and convoluted
statutory provisions like § 924(c)(a)(A)-or what one court has called "super-
sentence[s]."98 In these cases, a diagram may simply help a judge wrap her head
around the text. Unfortunately for both judges and litigants, these convoluted
sentences are becoming a more and more common part of our legal system.99
But, fortunately, sentence diagrams are ideally suited for addressing the problem
of super-sentences.
Conclusion
Whether or not Justice Gorsuch becomes the first Justice to include a
sentence diagram in a Supreme Court opinion,0 0 we should recognize that
sentence diagrams already play an important role in our legal system. For over a
century, judges have used diagrams to help them interpret legal texts, and there
are good reasons for them to continue the practice. Of course, judges for whom
sentence diagramming brings up traumatic grade-school memories need not
95. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 40 (2010).
96. See Eichhorn, supra note 11, at 103.
97. See supra note 57 (surveying debate between textualism and contextualism in
contract interpretation).
98. See State v. Gates, 325 N.W.2d 166, 168 (N.D. 1982).
99. Cf Cynthia R. Farina et. al., The Problem with Words: Plain Language and Public
Participation in Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1358 (2015) (noting increasing complexity of
regulatory documents).
100. Other Justices may have used sentence diagrams without formally mentioning
their use in the opinion. See Steed, supra note 1 (noting that sentence diagramming seems like "the sort
of thing" Justice Antonin Scalia would have done).
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engage in the exercise.1ot But for those of us who enjoy parsing sentences-or
at least do not mind it-diagramming can be an important tool for understanding
syntactic meaning.
101. See supra notes 38 and 71 and accompanying text.
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